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When do people find it acceptable to sacrifice one life to save
many? Cross-cultural studies suggested a complex pattern of uni-
versals and variations in the way people approach this question,
but data were often based on small samples from a small num-
ber of countries outside of the Western world. Here we analyze
responses to three sacrificial dilemmas by 70,000 participants
in 10 languages and 42 countries. In every country, the three
dilemmas displayed the same qualitative ordering of sacrifice
acceptability, suggesting that this ordering is best explained by
basic cognitive processes rather than cultural norms. The quanti-
tative acceptability of each sacrifice, however, showed substantial
country-level variations. We show that low relational mobility
(where people are more cautious about not alienating their cur-
rent social partners) is strongly associated with the rejection of
sacrifices for the greater good (especially for Eastern countries),
which may be explained by the signaling value of this rejec-
tion. We make our dataset fully available as a public resource
for researchers studying universals and variations in human
morality.
morality | dilemma | culture
Every culture has rules about what is right or wrong, but theyoften disagree on the particulars of moral decisions. Moral
universals are difficult to find, as they often reveal some degree
of cultural variation upon closer inspection. For example, most
people think that accidental transgressions are not as bad as
intentional transgressions, but the importance of this distinction
varies across cultures, to the point of disappearing in some small-
scale societies (1, 2). Likewise, most people refrain from acting in
a purely self-interested manner in economic games, but different
cultures have different expectations about what constitutes fair
behavior in these games (3). Likewise again, every culture pro-
hibits at least some form of homicide, while disagreeing about
which exact form of homicide is wrong (4, 5): Different cultures
can have different views on what counts as self-defense or provo-
cation, or on the offenses that should be punished with capital
execution.
Accordingly, studying moral judgment at a global scale
is important for theoretical development. When researchers
attempt to develop a theory of moral psychology based on find-
ings that replicate in a handful of countries, they can find it
challenging to determine whether the findings reflect basic, uni-
versal cognitive processes or some similarities in social and
cultural contexts (6). The larger and the more diverse the set
of countries in which the findings hold, however, the greater
the appeal of theories based on basic cognitive processes or
universal moral grammars (7–9). Conversely, when researchers
attempt to develop theory on the basis of findings that differ in
a handful of countries, they can find it challenging to pinpoint
the exact cultural features that may explain these differences,
since any two countries can differ on many cultural traits. The
larger and more diverse the set of countries, the easier the task
becomes.
In this article, we report on the moral universals and variations
in responses to three variants of the trolley problem (10, 11),
one of the focal points of contemporary moral psychology (12).
Based on the responses of 70,000 participants, collected in 10
languages and 42 countries with a lower bound of 200 responses
per scenario and country (Fig. 1A), we firmly consolidate some
results of previous comparative surveys, and provide evidence of
cultural correlates that were not possible to assess from other,
smaller datasets. To this end, we leveraged the popularity of
the “Moral Machine” website (moralmachine.mit.edu). While
the Moral Machine website was primarily designed to explore the
ethics of self-driving cars (13), it also offered a “Classic” mode,
where visitors made decisions about the traditional Switch, Loop,
and Footbridge variants of the trolley problem; these are the data
that we report in this article.
In the first scenario illustrated in Fig. 1B (the Switch), a trolley
is about to kill five workers, but can be redirected to a different
track, in which case it will kill one worker. In the third sce-
nario illustrated in Fig. 1D (the Footbridge), a large man can
be pushed in front of the trolley. The large man will die, but his
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Fig. 1. Geographical coverage and stimuli. (A) Many participants came from Europe and the Americas, but more than 40 countries delivered sample sizes
of 200+ participants. Participants made decisions in three scenario variants: (B) Switch, (C) Loop, and (D) Footbridge.
body will stop the trolley before it can kill the five workers on
the track. There are two important differences between Switch
and Footbridge. First, the death of the worker in Switch is not
instrumental in saving the five—it is an incidental yet foresee-
able side effect of the action that saves the five. In contrast, in
Footbridge, the death of the large man is instrumental in sav-
ing the five—his death would not be a side effect, but a means
to save them (10, 11). Second, the sacrifice of the large man
in Footbridge requires the use of personal force against him,
whereas no personal force is exerted against anyone in Switch
(14, 15). These two factors make it psychologically more accept-
able to act in Switch than in Footbridge. In the Loop scenario
illustrated in Fig. 1C, the trolley can be redirected to a differ-
ent track, where it will kill one worker whose body will stop the
trolley before it can kill the five. Personal force is not required
against anyone, and many find it difficult to decide whether the
death of the worker is intended or merely foreseen (16, 17).
As a result, people tend to place the acceptability of acting in
Loop somewhere in between that of Switch and Footbridge, a
pattern of moral preferences we will simply call Switch–Loop–
Footbridge.
The first objective of this article is to consolidate the universal-
ity of the qualitative Switch–Loop–Footbridge pattern. Indeed,
despite the complexity of the Switch–Loop–Footbridge prefer-
ences, and that of their emotional and cognitive correlates (15,
18–20), there is evidence that their ranking might be universal.
The preference for Switch over Footbridge is already well doc-
umented. Because this preference is large, it is easy to detect
even with small samples, and it was, indeed, detected in at least
30 countries (21–25). The difference between Switch and Loop
is smaller and requires larger sample sizes. For example, one
survey using large random samples of 1,000 participants estab-
lished this difference in the United States, China, and Russia
(24). The “Many Labs 2” project (25) obtained preferences for
Switch, Loop, and Footbridge in 19 countries, the most diverse
dataset so far. Switch was significantly preferred to Loop in 11
countries (with a median sample size n =149 per scenario).
Switch was nonsignificantly preferred to Loop in six countries
(median n =59 per scenario), and two countries (median n =39
per scenario) showed a nonsignificant difference in the oppo-
site direction. The difference between Loop and Footbridge is
typically larger, and was detected as significant in 16 out of 19
countries.
Fewer data are available regarding the second objective of this
article, which is to document cultural variations in the quanti-
tative acceptance of sacrifice in Switch, Loop, and Footbridge.
Even if the relative ranking of these preferences turns out to
be constant, different countries may endorse sacrifice at differ-
ent absolute levels. Some previous comparative studies tested
whether the difference between Switch and Footbridge was
moderated by culture, and did not find evidence for such a mod-
eration (21, 22, 25). Other studies, however, directly compared
the rates at which participants in different countries endorsed
sacrifice. Russian participants in one such study endorsed sac-
rifice less in all three scenarios, compared to a mixed sam-
ple of American, Canadian, and British participants (23), but
this difference was not replicated in a larger sample compar-
ing Russian and American participants (24). This latter study,
however, found that Chinese participants endorsed sacrifice
less in all three scenarios, compared to Russian or American
participants—and another study found that Chinese participants
were less likely than British participants to endorse sacrifice
in Switch (26).
In this article, we report data from a much broader range
of countries, allowing us to explore the cultural correlates of
the willingness to sacrifice in Switch, Loop, and Footbridge.
In Results, we will document the correlations between moral
preferences and a standard set of country-level variables (indi-
vidualism, religiosity, and gross domestic product)—but we want
to emphasize the theoretical interest of one specific variable,
relational mobility. Relational mobility refers to the fluidity with
which people can develop new relationships (27, 28). In societies
with low relational mobility, people develop lifelong relation-
ships but have few options to develop new ones. As a result,
they show greater social cautiousness, in order to avoid conflict
in existing relationships (29). In contrast, in societies with high
relational mobility, people have many options to find new social
partners, which makes it easier to leave old friends behind and
replace them with new friends (30). This flexibility may explain
why people in high relational mobility societies show greater
self-disclosure, which, in turn, makes it easier to end up with
like-minded friends (31).
Accordingly, holding attitudes that put one at social risk
is especially costly in low relational mobility societies, where
alienating one’s current social partners is harder to recover
from. This cost is likely lower (although not absent) in high
relational mobility societies, as they offer abundant options
to find new, like-minded partners. Accordingly, people in low
relational mobility societies may be less likely to express and
even hold attitudes that send a negative social signal. Endors-
ing sacrifice in the trolley problem is just such an attitude.
Recent research has shown that people who endorse sacrifice
in the trolley problem are perceived as less trustworthy, and
less likely to be chosen as social partners (32–34). As a con-
sequence, low relational mobility societies may feature more
acute pressure against holding this unpopular opinion. Although
it is possible that this pressure would discourage people who
hold socially risky positions from expressing them, it could
also change people’s attitudes, making certain ideas morally
“unthinkable.”
This conjecture is not trivial, for at least two reasons. First, it
assumes that the preference for sacrifice in the trolley problem
sends a negative social signal in low relational mobility societies,
but the effect has only been shown so far in Western, high rela-
tional mobility societies. Second, it assumes that people in high
relational mobility societies, such as those of the North Atlantic,





















Fig. 2. Percentage choosing to sacrifice in each scenario variant. In all of these countries, participants were most likely to sacrifice in Switch, then in Loop,
then in Footbridge. Within each continent, countries are ordered by decreasing order of the average acceptability of sacrifice in the three scenarios. Oc.,
Oceania. AU: Australia, NZ: New Zealand, US: United States of America, MX: Mexico, CA: Canada, BR: Brazil, AR: Argentina, CO: Colombia, CZ: Czechia,
GB: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, HU: Hungary, PT: Portugal, IE: Ireland, FR: France, SE: Sweden, BE: Belgium, ES: Spain, IT: Italy,
SK: Slovakia, RO: Romania, NL: Netherlands, NO: Norway, FI: Finland, DE: Germany, PL: Poland, CH: Switzerland, UA: Ukraine, DK: Denmark, RU: Russian
Federation, GR: Greece, AT: Austria, BY: Belarus, VN: Viet Nam, IL: Israel, TR: Turkey, IN: India, SG: Singapore, HK: Hong Kong, KR: The Republic of Korea, JP:
Japan, TW: Taiwan (Province of China), CN: China.
have less to lose by holding unpopular opinions—linking rela-
tional mobility to other frequently discussed East–West differ-
ences (35). Alternatively, in an environment with a more fluid
interpersonal marketplace, people would compete more to be
chosen as relational partners, and would thus experience greater
pressure against holding opinions that mark them as untrust-
worthy. Our large and diverse dataset provides the ideal testing
grounds for clarifying the association between relational mobility
and moral decisions.
Indeed, we collected the largest and most diverse dataset so
far on moral decisions about the three main variants of the trol-
ley problem, recording responses from 70,000 participants in 10
languages and more than 40 countries (36). This dataset allows
us to provide unprecedented insights about cultural universals
and differences in moral psychology. First, it reveals a univer-
sal pattern of support for the Switch–Loop–Footbridge spectrum
that is suggestive of a common underlying cognitive structure.
Second, the systematic variability between groups and its rela-
tion to other cross-national variables of interest speaks to recent
debates about the ecological validity of the trolley problem
(37, 38).
Results
Results provide the best available evidence so far for the uni-
versality of the Switch–Loop–Footbridge pattern. As shown in
Fig. 2, every country in our dataset showed the same pat-
tern of responses: Participants endorsed sacrifice more for
Switch (country-level average: 81%) than for Loop (country-
level average: 72%), and for Loop more than for Footbridge
(country-level average: 51%). These figures are consistent with
recent data (39) showing that the moral acceptability of sacri-
fice in Footbridge-type dilemmas has steadily increased in the
last few decades, reaching about 45 to 60% for participants
born after 1990—but we note that this high acceptability could
also be due to other demographic characteristics of our sam-
ple (see Materials and Methods and SI Appendix for further
details).
As shown in Fig. 3A, the difference between the endorse-
ment of sacrifice in Switch and in Loop was small, with an
effect size of about 0.10 (Cohen’s h). While there were sub-
stantial national differences in this effect for countries with a
small sample size, these differences gradually disappeared for
countries with greater sample sizes (and, thus, greater statis-
tical power). This convergence suggests that the psychological
difference between Switch and Loop might be relatively homo-
geneous across the world. In contrast, Fig. 3B shows a different
pattern for the difference between Loop and Footbridge. Here
we can see that heterogeneity between countries increases for
countries with greater sample sizes. This suggests that responses
to the Footbridge problem are subject to strong cultural
influences.
Previous research (reviewed in the Introduction) suggested
that participants from Eastern countries would be less likely
to endorse sacrifice in trolley problems than participants from
Western countries. These surveys often compared China or
Japan to the United States. Here, we reproduce these find-
ings, with an important nuance. As shown in Fig. 2, it is true,
in our data, that participants from the United States are much
Fig. 3. Funnel plots for the difference in decisions between scenario variants. (A) The difference between the proportion of participants choosing to
sacrifice in Switch and the proportion choosing to sacrifice in Loop was small, with an effect size converging to about 0.10 as a function of increasing sample
size. (B) The difference between the proportion of participants choosing to sacrifice in Loop and the proportion choosing to sacrifice in Footbridge was
twice as large, but also heterogeneous, with greater variance in countries with greater sample size.














































Fig. 4. Association between relational mobility and decisions in the three scenario variants. (A) Scatter plots and (B) tables with regression model coefficients
and P values show that greater relational mobility is correlated with a greater propensity to endorse sacrifice in all variants, even after controlling for other
relevant country-level variables. This correlation is especially strong among the subsample of Asian countries, as shown by the regression lines which were
fitted to this subsample for illustration.
more likely to endorse sacrifice than participants in China or
Japan—however, it is also true that the United States is among
the Western countries most likely to endorse sacrifice, while
China and Japan are among the Eastern countries least likely
to endorse sacrifice. As a result, surveys that focused on a US–
China or US–Japan comparison might have overestimated the
magnitude of the Western–Eastern difference. Asian countries,
in particular, show large variations in the baseline acceptability of
sacrifice in all scenario variants—but this is also true, to a lesser
extent, of Western countries.
Our large dataset allowed us to further explore these cultural
variations. We explore a wider array of these in SI Appendix, but,
as explained in the Introduction, we focused on the association
between relational mobility and the propensity to endorse sacri-
fice in each scenario variant. As shown in Fig. 4A, this association
is positive. Relational mobility was positively correlated with
the propensity to endorse sacrifice in Switch (r21 =0.67,
p< 0.001, 95% CI 0.36 to 0.85), in Loop (r21 =0.56, p=0.005,
95% CI 0.20 to 0.79), and in Footbridge (r21 =0.64, p< 0.001,
95% CI 0.32 to 0.83). These associations were robust in regres-
sion models (Fig. 4B) that controlled for individualism, gross
domestic product, and religiosity.∗ Interestingly, the effect of
relational mobility was mostly driven by Asian countries, which
span the lower half of relational mobility. In Asian countries,
the correlation between relational mobility and taking action
was 0.95 for Switch (p=0.004, 95% CI 0.59 to 0.99), 0.83 for
Loop (p=0.04, 95% CI 0.05 to 0.98), and 0.93 for Footbridge
(p=0.007, 95% CI 0.50 to 0.99). Non-Asian countries, mean-
while, cluster high in both relational mobility and propensity to
sacrifice, as would be expected on the basis of the trend revealed
by the Asian countries.
Discussion
Most people would agree that killing is wrong—but perhaps
not in all circumstances. Homicide is such a grave act that
it is of considerable psychological interest to understand the
*See SI Appendix for zero-order correlations with and between these variables, as well
as four additional country-level variables (cultural looseness, rule of law, national IQ,
and support for military targeting of civilians), which we included for exploratory
purposes.





















contexts in which people may tolerate the killing of another
human. For at least two decades now, moral psychologists have
been collecting data on one such context: When do people find it
acceptable to sacrifice one life to save many? These data sug-
gested a complex pattern of universals and variations in the
way different cultures tackle this question. On the one hand,
data suggested that people from different cultures displayed a
remarkable qualitative regularity, the Switch–Loop–Footbridge
ordered pattern of preferences. On the other hand, data also sug-
gested that people from different cultures displayed quantitative
variations in the exact degree to which they endorsed sacrifice
in each of these scenarios—mostly such that people from East-
ern countries showed less acceptance than people from Western
countries. One limitation of these findings is that they were
often based on small samples from a small number of countries
outside of the Western world. Thanks to the popularity of the
Moral Machine website, we were able to collect data at a much
greater scale.
Our sample is large but by no means ideal. We relied on vol-
untary participation in a viral online experiment, and our sample
shows clear signs of self-selection. As described in Materials and
Methods and detailed in SI Appendix, our sample is skewed in
terms of age, gender, and education: We estimate that a third
of our participants were young, college-educated men. Thus,
our population is more diverse than a convenience sample of
university students, but does not optimally reflect the diversity
of the countries we collected data from. We fully acknowledge
this limitation, but we note that, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no research group has ever attempted to collect data on
moral preferences from nationally representative samples in 42
countries.
With this caveat, our data provide the best existing evidence
that people universally endorse sacrifice in Switch more than
in Loop, and in Loop more than in Footbridge. Given this
universal result, it seems appropriate to explain the qualita-
tive Switch–Loop–Footbridge pattern in terms of basic cog-
nitive processes, rather than to seek explanations based on
cultural norms. In contrast, we observed substantial country-
level variations in the quantitative acceptability of each sacri-
fice. Our data replicated previous results, such as the lower
acceptability observed in China compared to the United States—
but they also allowed us to explore country-level variations
at a finer granularity, for example, by going beyond East–
West differences and focusing on variations between Eastern
countries.
We focused our analysis on relational mobility, because of
its theoretical interest, but one limitation of this strategy is
that relational mobility has not been estimated yet in all of the
countries represented in our dataset. However, since we are mak-
ing our dataset public, researchers will be able to update our
analyses once relational mobility is measured in new countries—
or conduct new analyses based on any country-level variable
which may be associated with cultural variations in moral pref-
erences. Indeed, we believe that an important contribution of
this article is the public resource we are making available to
the scientific community: a dataset containing moral preferences
expressed by 70,000 participants in 10 languages and more than
40 countries.
Materials and Methods
Data collection started in June 2017, when we deployed a Classic mode
as part of the Moral Machine website.† This Classic mode only offered
†The Moral Machine website (moralmachine.mit.edu) was designed to collect data on
the moral acceptability of decisions made by autonomous vehicles, and was deployed
in June 2016. The website offers three interfaces other than the Classic mode, which
are not discussed in this paper.
three scenarios (Switch, Loop, Footbridge). The three scenarios were graph-
ically designed to retain a distinct Moral Machine visual identity while
using a sepia color palette, which distinguished them from the futuristic
Moral Machine scenarios featuring autonomous vehicles. While the Moral
Machine (and its Classic mode) is still collecting data, this paper reports
results obtained during the first 20 months of data collection, up until March
2019.
Users of the Classic mode are presented with the three standard trolley
scenarios, in a random order. We restricted our sample to users who gave
a response to all three scenarios, and to countries in which at least 200
users did so. Each scenario is introduced with the question “What should
the man in blue do?” Two images shown side by side show the two possible
decisions and their outcomes. They are augmented with a text descrip-
tion, as follows (the words Switch, Loop, and Footbridge are not shown to
participants):
Switch. A man in blue is standing by the railroad tracks when he notices
an empty boxcar rolling out of control. It is moving so fast that anyone
it hits will die. Ahead on the main track are five people. There is one
person standing on a side track that doesn’t rejoin the main track. If
the man in blue does nothing, the boxcar will hit the five people on
the main track, but not the one person on the side track. If the man
in blue flips a switch next to him, it will divert the boxcar to the side
track where it will hit the one person, and not hit the five people on
the main track.
Loop. A man in blue is standing by the railroad tracks when he notices
an empty boxcar rolling out of control. It is moving so fast that any-
one it hits will die. Ahead on the main track are five people. There is
one person standing on a side track that loops back toward the five
people. If the man in blue does nothing, the boxcar will hit the five
people on the main track, but not the one person on the side track.
If the man in blue flips a switch next to him, it will divert the box-
car to the side track where it will hit the one person and grind to a
halt, thereby not looping around and killing the five people on the
main track.
Footbridge. A man in blue is standing on a footbridge over the rail-
road tracks when he notices an empty boxcar rolling out of control. It
is moving so fast that anyone it hits will die. Ahead on the track are
five people. There is a large person standing near the man in blue on
the footbridge, and this large person weighs enough that the boxcar
would slow down if it hit him (the man in blue does not weigh enough
to slow down the boxcar). If the man in blue does nothing, the boxcar
will hit the five people on the track. If the man in blue pushes the one
person, that one person will fall onto the track, where the boxcar will
hit the one person, slow down because of the one person, and not hit
the five people farther down the track.
Using a translation and back-translation process, we made this descrip-
tion available in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Japanese,
Korean, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. The country from which users
accessed the website was geolocalized through the IP address of their com-
puter or mobile device. After completing the three-scenario session, users
had an opportunity to share the link to the experiment with their social net-
work, and were presented with an optional survey of their demographic,
political, and religious characteristics. About 20,000 users opted to fill out
that survey, and their responses gave us an approximate estimation of the
composition of the sample. This composition deviated from the general
population in several ways: 75% of survey takers were men, 75% were
younger than 32, and 73% were college-educated (overall, 36% of sur-
vey takers were young, college-educated men). Their political beliefs were
skewed toward the left (with a mean score of 37 on a 0 to 100 scale from
progressive to conservative), and their religiosity was skewed toward sec-
ular (with a mean score of 25 on a 0 to 100 scale from nonreligious to
religious). See SI Appendix for a complete description of the sample of sur-
vey takers as well as an analysis of the impact of these characteristics on
their decisions.
Data Availability. All of the data and code used in this article have been
deposited in the Open Science Framework, and can be accessed using the
following website: https://bit.ly/2Y7Brr9.
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